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Abstract. An oracle chooses a function f from the set of n bits strings
to itself, which is either a randomly chosen permutation or a randomly
chosen function. When queried by an n-bit string w, the oracle computes
f(w), truncates the m last bits, and returns only the first n − m bits
of f(w). How many queries does a querying adversary need to submit
in order to distinguish the truncated permutation from the (truncated)
function?
In 1998, Hall et al. [4] showed an algorithm for determining (with high
probability) whether or not f is a permutation, using O(2
m+n
2 ) queries.
They also showed that if m < n/7, a smaller number of queries will not
suffice. For m > n/7, their method gives a weaker bound. In this note,
we first show how a modification of the approximation method used by
Hall et al. can solve the problem completely. It extends the result to
practically any m, showing that Ω(2
m+n
2 ) queries are needed to get a
non-negligible distinguishing advantage. However, more surprisingly, a
better bound for the distinguishing advantage can be obtained from a
result of Stam [8] published, in a different context, already in 1978. We
also show that, at least in some cases, the bound in [8] is tight.
Keywords: Pseudo random permutations, pseudo random functions, advan-
tage.
1 Introduction
Distinguishing a randomly chosen permutation from a random function is a com-
binatorial problem which is fundamental in cryptology. A few examples where
this problem plays an important role are the security analysis of block ciphers,
hash and MAC schemes.
One formulation of this problem is the following. An oracle chooses a func-
tion F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, which is either a randomly (uniformly) chosen per-
mutation of {0, 1}n, or a randomly (uniformly) chosen function from {0, 1}n to
{0, 1}n. An adversary selects a “querying and guessing” algorithm. He first uses
it to submit q (adaptive) queries to the oracle, and the oracle responds with F (w)
to the query w ∈ {0, 1}n. After collecting the q responses, the adversary uses
his algorithm to guess whether or not F is a permutation. The quality of such
an algorithm (in the cryptographic context) is the ability to distinguish between
the two cases (rather than successfully guessing which one it is). It is measured
by the difference between the probability that the algorithm outputs a certain
answer, given that the oracle chose a permutation, and the probability that the
algorithm outputs the same answer, given that the oracle chose a function. This
difference is called the ”advantage” of the algorithm. We are interested in esti-
mating Adv, which is the maximal advantage of the adversary, over all possible
algorithms, as a function of a budget of q queries.
The well known answer to this problem is based on the simple “collision test”
and the Birthday Problem:
Adv = 1−
(
1− 1
2n
)(
1− 2
2n
)
. . .
(
1− q − 1
2n
)
.
Since for every 1 ≤ k ≤ q − 1
1− q
2n
≤
(
1− k
2n
)(
1− q − k
2n
)
≤
(
1− q
2n+1
)2
,
we get, for q ≤ 2n, that
1−e− q(q−1)2n+1 ≤ 1−
(
1− q
2n+1
)q−1
≤ Adv ≤ 1−
(
1− q
2n
) q−1
2 ≤ q(q − 1)
2n+1
. (1.1)
This result implies that the number of queries required to distinguish a ran-
dom permutation from a random function, with success probability significantly
larger than, say, 12 , is Θ(2
n
2 ). We now consider the following generalization of
this problem:
Problem 1. [Distinguishing a truncated permutation] Let 0 ≤ m < n be
integers. An oracle chooses c ∈ {0, 1}. If c = 1, it picks a permutation p of {0, 1}n
uniformly at random, and if c = 0, it picks a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
uniformly at random. An adversary is allowed to submit queries w ∈ {0, 1}n to
the oracle. The oracle computes α = p(w) (if c = 1) or α = f(w) (if c = 0),
truncates (with no loss of generality) the last m bits from α, and replies with
the remaining (n−m) bits. The adversary has a budget of q (adaptive) queries,
and after exhausting this budget, is expected to guess c. How many queries does
the adversary need in order to gain non-negligible advantage?
Specifically, we seek q 1
2
= min{q | Adv ≥ 12} as a function of m and n.
2 So, how many queries are really needed?
The Birthday bound (folklore): We start with remarking that the classical
”Birthday” bound q 1
2
= Ω(2n/2) is obviously valid as a bound for the adversary’s
advantage in Problem 1. In fact, any algorithm that the adversary can use with
the truncated replies of (n −m) bits from f(w) can also be used by the adver-
sary who sees the full f(w) (he can ignorem bits and apply the same algorithm).
Of course, we are looking for a better upper bound that would reflect the fact
that the adversary receives less information when f(w) is truncated. We have
the following bounds for Problem 1.
Hall et al. [4] (1988): Problem 1 was studied by Hall et al. [4] in 1998. The
authors showed an algorithm that gives a non-negligible distinguishing advantage
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using q = O(2(n+m)/2) queries (for anym). They also proved the following upper
bound:
Adv ≤ 5
(
q
2
n+m
2
) 2
3
+
1
2
(
q
2
n+m
2
)3
1
2
n−7m
2
(2.1)
For m ≤ n/7 the bound in (2.1) implies that q 1
2
= Ω(2
m+n
2 ). However,
for larger values of m, the bound on q 1
2
that is offered by (2.1) deteriorates,
and becomes (already for m > n/4)worse than the trivial ”Birthday” bound
q 1
2
= Ω(2n/2).
Hall et al. [4] conjectured that Ω(2
m+n
2 ) queries are needed in order to get a
non-negligible advantage, in the general case.
Bellare and Impagliazzo [1] (1999): Theorem 4.2 in [1] states that
Adv = O(n)
q
2
n+m
2
(2.2)
whenever 2n−m < q < 2
n+m
2 .
This implies that q 1
2
= Ω( 1n2
m+n
2 ) for m > 13n+
2
3 log2 n+Ω(1).
Gilboa and Gueron [2] (2013): The method used to show (2.1) can be pushed
to prove the conjecture in [4] for (almost) everym. In particular, it can be shown
that if m ≤ n/3 then
Adv ≤ 2 3
√
2
(
q
2
n+m
2
) 2
3
+
2
√
2√
3
(
q
2
n+m
2
) 3
2
+
(
q
2
n+m
2
)2
, (2.3)
and if n3 < m ≤ n− 4− log2 n then
Adv ≤ 3
(
q
2
n+m
2
) 2
3
+ 2
(
q
2
n+m
2
)
+ 5
(
q
2
n+m
2
)2
+
1
2
(
2q
2
n+m
2
) n
n−m
. (2.4)
This implies that q 1
2
= Ω(2
m+n
2 ) for any 0 ≥ m ≥ n− 4− log2(n).
Stam [8] (1978): Surprisingly, it turns out that Problem 1 was solved 20 years
before Hall et al. [4], in a different context. The bound
Adv ≤ 1
2
√
(2n−m − 1)q(q − 1)
(2n − 1)(2n − (q − 1) ≤
1
2
√
1− q−12n
· q
2
n+m
2
, (2.5)
which is valid for all 0 ≤ m < n, follows directly from a result of Stam [8,
Theorem 2.3]. (Note that if q ≤ 342n then (2.5) can be simplified to Adv ≤ q
2
m+n
2
).
This implies that q 1
2
= Ω(2
m+n
2 ) for any 0 ≥ m ≥ n, confirming the conjec-
ture of [4] in all generality (20 years before the conjecture was raised).
Remark 1. The bound (2.5) is tighter than all the bounds mentioned above,
with one exception: the elementary upper bound (1.1) is better than (2.5) for
q ≤ 2n−m2 .
3
3 Different methods give different bounds
It is interesting to see how different approaches yield different bounds for Prob-
lem 1. To this end, we first define some notations.
For fixed m < n and q ≤ 2n denote Ωq := ({0, 1}n−m)q. We view Ωq as the
set of all possible sequences of replies that can be given by the oracle (to the
adversary’s q queries).
For any j ≥ 2 , ω ∈ Ω let
colj(ω) = #{1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < ij ≤ q | ωi1 = ωi2 = . . . = ωij}
For ω = (w1, w2, . . . , wq) ∈ Ω and 1 ≤ r ≤ q, let
Vr(ω) := {(x1, x2, . . . , xq) ∈ Ω | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r : xi = wi}
be the set of sequences of replies that are the same as ω up to the r-th query.
For ω ∈ Ω let Prperm(ω) and Prfunc(ω) be the probabilities that ω is the
actual sequence of replies that the oracle gives to the adversary’s q queries, in the
case the oracle chose a random permutation or a random function, respectively.
For 1 ≤ r ≤ q, let
Q(r)perm(ω) =
Prperm(Vr(ω))
Prperm(Vr−1(ω))
, Q
(r)
func(ω) =
Prfunc(Vr(ω))
Prfunc(Vr−1(ω))
.
Note that
Prperm(ω) =
q∏
r=1
Q(r)perm(ω), Prfunc(ω) =
q∏
r=1
Q
(r)
func(ω).
3.1 The proof method of Hall et al.
The proof of (2.1) uses the general bound
Adv ≤ max
ω∈S
∣∣∣∣Prperm({ω})Prfunc({ω}) − 1
∣∣∣∣+max{Prfunc(S),Prperm(S)} ≤
≤ 2max
ω∈S
∣∣∣∣Prperm({ω})Prfunc({ω}) − 1
∣∣∣∣+ Prfunc(S). (3.1)
that holds for any S ⊆ Ω. It is applied to the set
S :=
{
ω ∈ Ω :
∣∣∣∣col2(ω)−
(
q
2
)
1
2n−m
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c1 q
2
n−m
2
, col3(ω) = 0
}
,
The expression maxω∈S
∣∣∣Prperm({ω})Prfunc({ω}) − 1
∣∣∣ is bounded by direct computations.
The expression Prfunc(S) is bounded by combining the Union Bound and the
Chebyshev inequality. Finally, c1 is chosen to minimize the resulting bounds.
3.2 The proof method of Gilboa and Gueron
To get (2.3) (for m ≤ n/3), we can apply the slightly better (than (3.1)) bound
Adv ≤ 1
2
max
ω∈S
∣∣∣∣Prperm({ω})Prfunc({ω}) − 1
∣∣∣∣+ 12 (Prfunc(S) + Prperm(S)) ≤
≤ max
ω∈S
∣∣∣∣Prperm({ω})Prfunc({ω}) − 1
∣∣∣∣+min{Prfunc(S),Prperm(S)} . (3.2)
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to the set
S :=
{
ω ∈ Ω :
∣∣∣∣col2(ω)−
(
q
2
)
1
2n−m
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c2 q2/322m/32n/3 , col3(ω) ≤ c3 q
3/2
2n
}
Here, c2, c3 are chosen to minimize the bound. Again, maxω∈S
∣∣∣Prperm({ω})Prfunc({ω}) − 1
∣∣∣
is bounded by direct (elaborate) computation, and Prfunc(S) is bounded by
combining (via the Union Bound) the Chebyshev inequality and the Markov
inequality.
The bound (2.4) (for n/3 < m ≤ n−4−log2 n) follows similarly by examining
the set
S :=
{
ω ∈ Ω :
∣∣∣∣colj+1(ω)−
(
q
j + 1
)
1
2j(n−m)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ αj ∀1 ≤ j ≤ t− 1 , colt+1(ω) ≤ β
}
for t :=
⌈
n+m
n−m
⌉
and α1, . . . , αt−1, β which are chosen to optimize the bound.
3.3 The proof method of Bellare and Impagliazzo
Bellare and Impagliazzo also used (3.2), for the set S of all ω ∈ Ω satisfying (for
suitable δ and λ):
1. For any 1 ≤ r ≤ q, ∣∣∣∣∣log Q
(r)
perm(ω)
Q
(r)
funcω)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3δ2
2. For any 1 ≤ r ≤ q,∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈Vr−1(ω)
Prfunc(x)
Prfunc(Vr−1(ω))
log
Q
(r)
perm(x)
Q
(r)
func(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
δ2
2
,
3. ∣∣∣∣∣∣log
Prperm(ω)
Prfuncω)
−
q∑
r=1
∑
x∈Vr−1(ω)
Prfunc(x)
Prfunc(Vr−1(ω))
log
Q
(r)
perm(x)
Q
(r)
func(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
δ(δ + 3)λ
√
q
2
.
The expression Prfunc(S) is bounded by combining the Azuma inequality
and the observation that for any 1 ≤ r ≤ q,
0 ≥
∑
ω∈Ω
Q
(r)
func(ω) log
Q
(r)
perm(ω)
Q
(r)
func(ω)
≥ −1
2
(
max
ω∈S
∣∣∣∣∣Q
(r)
perm(ω)
Q
(r)
func(ω)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
)2
,
3.4 The proof method of Stam
Stam’s approach observes that by Pinsker’s inequality (1960) [7] 3 we have
Adv ≤ 1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
|Prperm(ω)− Prfunc(ω)| ≤
≤
√
1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
Prperm(ω) log
Prperm(ω)
Prfunc(ω)
. (3.3)
3 The inequality as used in (3.4) was established independently by Csisza´r (1967) [3],
Kemperman (1968) [5], and Kullback [6]. Pinsker proved the inequality with a worse
constant.
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He then uses the decomposition
∑
ω∈Ω
Prperm(ω) log
Prperm(ω)
Prfunc(ω)
=
q∑
r=1
∑
ω∈Ω
Prperm(Vr−1(ω))Q(r)perm(ω) log
Q
(r)
perm(ω)
Q
(r)
func(ω)
,
direct (exact) computations, and the concavity of the log function.
4 Stam’s bound is sometimes sharp
In the case m = n− 1 (i.e., the oracle returns only 1 bit), (2.5) gives
Adv ≤ 1
2
√
q(q − 1)
(2n − 1)(2n − (q − 1) ≤
1√
2− q−12n−1
· q
2n
.
In this section we show that this bound is essentially sharp.
With no loss of generality we may assume q is even and q ≤ 122n. We define
the following adversarial algorithm.
Algorithm 1.
Collect the answers (which are, in this case, just bits) of q arbitrary queries.
Compute the difference ∆ between the number of 0’s and 1’s.
If ∆ ≤ √q/2, guess that the oracle was using a truncated random permuta-
tion. Otherwise, guess that the oracle was using a random function.
The advantage of Algorithm 1 is
∑
|k−(q−k)|<√q/2
(
q
k
)(∏k
i=1(2
n−1 − (i− 1)) ·∏q−ki=1 (2n−1 − (i− 1))∏q
i=1(2
n − (i− 1)) −
1
2q
)
=
=
∑
|k−(q−k)|<√q/2
(
q
k
)
1
2q
(∏k
i=1(2
n − 2(i− 1)) ·∏q−ki=1 (2n − 2(i− 1))∏q
i=1(2
n − (i− 1)) − 1
)
We show that (
q
k
)
1
2q
≥ 1
2
√
q
, (4.1)
pk :=
∏k
i=1(2
n − 2(i− 1)) ·∏q−ki=1 (2n − 2(i− 1))∏q
i=1(2
n − (i− 1)) > 1 +
q/2
2n
(4.2)
for any k such that |k − (q − k)| < √q/2. From this, we can conclude that
Adv >
√
q
1
2
√
q
q/2
2n
=
q/4
2n
.
First, note that for k = q/2.
(
q
q/2
)
1
2q
=
1
2
q/2∏
i=2
2i− 1
2i
≥ 1
2
q/2∏
i=2
√
i− 1√
i
=
1√
2q
, (4.3)
pq/2 =
q/2∏
i=1
(
1 +
1
2n − (2i− 1)
)
≥
(
1 +
1
1
22
n
)q/2
≥ 1 + q
2n
. (4.4)
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Since for any 0 ≤ j < q/2(
q
j
)
(
q
j+1
) = 1− q − 2j − 1
q − j > 1−
2(q − 2j − 1)
q
,
pj
pj+1
= 1− 2(q − 2j − 1)
2n − 2j ≥ 1−
4(q − 2j − 1)
2n
,
we get that for any q2 −
√
q
4 ≤ k < q2
(
q
k
)(
q
q/2
) =
q
2−1∏
i=k
(
q
j
)
(
q
j+1
) ≥
q
2−1∏
j=k
(
1− 2(q − 2j − 1)
q
)
≥ 1− 2
∑ q
2−1
j=k (q − 2j − 1)
q
=
= 1− (q − 2k)
2
2q
≥ 7
8
,
pk
pq/2
=
q
2−1∏
i=k
pj
pj+1
≥
q
2−1∏
j=k
(
1− 4(q − 2j − 1)
2n
)
≥ 1− 4
∑ q
2−1
j=k (q − 2j − 1)
2n
=
= 1− (q − 2k)
2
2n
≥ 1− q/4
2n
.
Now, using (4.3) and (4.4) we get(
q
k
)
1
2q
=
(
q
k
)(
q
q/2
)( q
q/2
)
1
2q
≥ 7
8
· 1√
2q
>
1
2
√
q
,
pk =
pk
pq/2
pq/2 ≥
(
1− q/4
2n
)(
1 +
q
2n
)
> 1 +
q/2
2n
.
The proof of (4.1) and (4.2) for q2 < k ≤ q2 +
√
q
4 is similar.
5 An open problem
By combining (1.1), (2.5), and the trivial bound 1, we can conclude that the
best known bound for Problem 1 is
Adv ≤


q(q−1)
2n+1 q < (1 + o(1)) 2
n−m
2
1
2
√
(2n−m−1)q(q−1)
(2n−1)(2n−(q−1) (1 + o(1)) 2
n−m
2 ≤ q ≤ (2 + o(1)) 2n+m2
1 (2 + o(1)) 2
n+m
2 < q
(5.1)
By the lower bound in (1.1), we know that the bound in (5.1) is essentially
sharp for m = 0. By our proof in Section 4, we know that the bound in (5.1) is
essentially sharp m = n− 1. The natural question that remains open is whether
the bound (5.1) is essentially sharp for all 0 ≤ m < n.
References
1. M. Bellare, R. Impagliazzo, ”A tool for obtaining tighter security analyses
of pseudorandom function based constructions, with applications to PRP
to PRF conversion”, ePrint 1999/024, http://eprint.iacr.org/1999/024
(1999).
7
2. S. Gilboa, S. Gueron, ”Distinguishing a truncated random permutation
from a random function”, manuscript (2013)
3. I. Csisza´r, Information-type measures of difference of probability distri-
butions and indirect observations, Studia Sci. Math. Hungar. 2 (1967),
299–318.
4. C. Hall, D. Wagner, J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, Building prfs from prps, in:
Proceedings of CRYPTO-98: Advances in Cryptography, Springer Verlag,
1998, pp. 370-389.
5. J. H. B. Kemperman, On the optimum rate of transmitting information, in
Probability and Information Theory (Proc. Internat. Sympos., McMaster
Univ., Hamilton, Ont., 1968), 126–169, Springer, Berlin.
6. S. Kullback, ”A lower bound for discrimination information in terms of
variation”, IEEE Trans. Information Theory IT-13 (1967), 126–127.
7. M. S. Pinsker, Information and informational stability of random vari-
ables and processes (Russian), Problemy Peredacˇi Informacii, Vyp. 7, Akad.
Nauk SSSR, Moscow, 1960.
8. A. J. Stam, Distance between sampling with and without replacement,
Statist. Neerlandica 32 (1978), no. 2, 81–91.
8
